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FOREWORD 
 
Each year the Centre for Monetary Economics (CME) at The Department of Economics, 
BI Norwegian School of Management appoints an independent group of experts to 
evaluate monetary policy in Norway.  
This year the committee consists of Ragnar Torvik, Professor of Economics at 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology - NTNU, Anders Vredin, former Head 
of SNS - Centre for Business and Policy Studies in Stockholm, and Bjørn-Roger 
Wilhelmsen, Senior Analyst at Swedbank First Securities. The committee is solely 
responsible for the report and the views therein. The report does not necessarily represent 
the views of the CME or of its members. 
The Ministry of Finance partly funds the Norges Bank Watch reports, which contain 
useful information and analyses for the Ministry’s evaluation of monetary policy that is 
presented each year in a White Paper to Parliament.  
 
 
 
 
Oslo, 28 February 2012 
 
Centre for Monetary Economics 
 
Arne Jon Isachsen 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The conduct of monetary policy in 2011 is discussed in Chapter 2. Given the significant 
uncertainties about developments in the world economy and the dilemma of how to 
balance various risks, it is difficult to argue that Norges Bank has made any major 
mistakes. The key policy rate was increased in the first half of 2011 when economic 
growth was gaining momentum, and it was reduced again in December after the 
economic outlook had worsened.  
 
That being said, whether one sees monetary policy in Norway as well balanced during 
2011 or not depends on whether financial stability should be viewed as an independent 
objective for the central bank or not. If an extra weight should be given to financial 
stability in monetary policy – and we have sympathy for that idea – Norges Bank could, 
in principle, have raised the interest rate earlier and more during the first half of 2011. 
The cut in December could then be questioned. But if one does not accept that financial 
stability should be an objective for monetary policy in addition to the objective of 
stabilising output and inflation over the medium term, it is easier to come to the 
conclusion that monetary policy in 2011 was well balanced. 
 
As such, the exact size and timing of interest rate movements is a quantitative problem 
that cannot be addressed until the qualitative question about the central bank’s 
responsibility for financial stability has been clarified. We conclude that there is 
considerable room for improvement in Norges Bank’s communication of monetary 
policy. In particular, the role of financial stability for monetary policy needs to be 
clarified. 
 
NBW has looked for potential improvements in Norges Bank’s analyses and 
communication about the links between monetary policy and financial stability, and 
Chapter 3 is devoted to a discussion of such links. This is done in three steps. The first 
step is to discuss how the degree of financial stability influences the effects of monetary 
policy on inflation and output, i.e., the so-called transmission mechanism. This question 
is relevant regardless of whether one thinks that financial stability should be a separate 
objective for monetary policy or not. The second step concerns whether the central bank 
should have any responsibility for financial stability and, if so, whether this should have 
any implications for monetary policy (in addition to the effects via the transmission 
mechanism). Finally, a third set of questions arise about how the central bank’s 
responsibility for financial stability can be separated from similar tasks carried out by 
other authorities. 
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Regarding financial stability and the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy, we 
conclude that Norges Bank should clarify how changes in the degree of financial 
stability, as reflected, for example, in market interest rate spreads, influence the Bank’s 
forecasts and policy decisions. In October 2011 Norges Bank significantly revised its 
estimate of the average money market premium during 2011 and 2012. The revision 
could, in principle and in isolation, explain the entire interest rate cut in December. But 
the size of this policy move caught many observers by surprise. This suggests that there is 
a room for more transparency in this context. We also think that changes in the 
transmission mechanism should be included among the listed main criteria for an 
appropriate interest rate path.  
 
In Chapter 3 we also note that Norges Bank’s formal mandate when it comes to financial 
stability is unclear and needs to be clarified. We present several arguments from 
international experts suggesting that central banks should be responsible for financial 
stability. This does not necessarily imply that central banks (rather than e.g. financial 
supervisory authorities) should have the main responsibility for financial stability (at the 
macro level), or that financial stability concerns should influence interest rate policy – but 
many experts do indeed make such recommendations.  
There is also much discussion about which institution should be allocated new 
macroprudential instruments. We think that Norges Bank rather than the Financial 
Supervisory Authority of Norway (FSA) should be responsible for macroprudential 
policies. But there are many difficult issues related to this question that remain to be 
solved, as has been thoroughly elucidated in an excellent recent report from the Ministry 
of Finance, Norges Bank and the FSA. 
The independence of Norges Bank is discussed in Chapter 4. The Ministry of Finance 
and Norges Bank both view Norges Bank as very independent. Still, several issues 
relating to central bank independence might suggest that, at least on paper, Norges Bank 
is not among the most independent of central banks. In addition, there have traditionally 
been strong informal ties between the Ministry of Finance and Norges Bank. For 
instance, a governor without work experience in the Ministry has not been appointed 
since the Second World War.  
But the link between the Ministry of Finance and Norges Bank is not just an informal 
one. Section 2 of the Norges Bank Act states: 
 
“Before the Bank makes any decision of special importance, the matter shall be 
submitted to the ministry.” 
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Moreover, Section 2 continues: 
 
“The King in Council may adopt resolutions regarding the operations of the 
Bank. Such resolutions may take the form of general rules or instructions in 
individual cases. The Bank shall be given the opportunity to state its opinion 
before such resolutions are passed. The Storting shall be notified of resolutions as 
soon as possible.” 
Thus, according to the Norges Bank Act, the government may change decisions made by 
Norges Bank. Thus, compared to many other central banks, Norges Bank is not, on paper, 
very independent. We discuss different arguments related to this and argue that Norges 
Bank should be made more independent. We also argue that price stability should, as in 
most other countries, be explicitly defined in the legislation as one of Norges Bank’s 
primary responsibilities.  
 
A key issue in institutional design is the role of checks and balances when the 
government delegates decision-making power to independent institutions such as the 
central bank. The more independent the central bank, the stronger checks and balances 
there should be inside the bank. Compared to most other central banks, the Executive 
Board of Norges Bank has additional duties in that they are also responsible for the 
operations of NBIM. It may thus seem paradoxical that the external members of the 
Executive Board are only part-time. Moreover, new policy instruments related to 
macroprudential regulations will in the future most likely imply even greater 
responsibilities and work load (even if these policy instruments should be allocated to the 
FSA).  
 
This naturally raises the question of whether the responsibilities of the external members 
of Norges Bank’s Executive Board are outgrowing the current institutional design. We 
argue that the internal checks and balances need to be strengthened, and that the current 
part-time involvement of the external Executive Board members is not entirely consistent 
with their responsibilities. We also argue that more information about the discussions 
between the members of the Executive Board should be published. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In an international context, i.e. in comparison with relevant benchmark countries, current 
macroeconomic developments in Norway are very favourable. GDP growth is high, 
capacity utilisation close to normal, unemployment low, savings are high and inflation – 
despite the strong economy – is below the 2.5% target. Stabilisation policy would not 
seem to be facing any major challenges in the short run. 
 
But this does not mean that this fortunate situation should be taken for granted. The 
global economy still faces considerable uncertainty and the risk of new severe 
disturbances is high. There are always temptations for policy makers to be short-sighted. 
The need for institutional reforms and the trade-off between present and future 
generations is much discussed all over the world. Also Norway has reason to examine 
whether the country’s institutions are sufficiently robust to secure favourable long-term 
economic developments. 
 
In Section 2 we review and comment on Norges Bank’s monetary policy during 2011. 
We raise the question of whether monetary policy has been affected not only by the 
outlook for inflation and capacity utilisation, but also by financial stability concerns. This 
question could also be raised about monetary policy in many other central banks. In 
Section 3 we discuss various links between monetary policy and financial stability that 
require more analysis – in order to evaluate and predict monetary policy. 
 
In Section 4 we discuss Norges Bank’s independence. It is widely recognized that a clear 
price stability objective, independence and transparency have improved monetary policy 
in many countries over the past 15 – 20 years, compared with the situation in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Central bank independence, however, needs to be discussed in a new light, 
given the greater emphasis, internationally, on central banks’ responsibilities for financial 
stability. Good arguments can be made for institutional reforms that would increase 
Norges Bank’s independence, even using Norges Bank’s existing mandate. The need to 
clarify Norges Bank’s responsibility for financial stability makes the arguments for 
institutional reforms even stronger.  
 
The committee for Norges Bank Watch 2012 met with the Ministry of Finance on 
November, 23 2011 and with Norges Bank on November, 25 2011. We wish to thank 
Norges Bank for supplying us with useful data as well as assistance with language 
editing.  
 
The committee would also like to thank Arne Jon Isachsen and Erling Steigum for 
constructive comments.  
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The views presented, and the recommendations made, are those of the authors alone. All 
recommendations are unanimous. 
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2. MONETARY POLICY IN 2011 
The key policy rate stood at 2% at the beginning of 2011, having remained unchanged 
since the 25 bp increase in May 2010. The projections in the last Monetary Policy Report 
(MPR) in 2010 were consistent with stable interest rates until around mid 2011 and a 
gradual increase thereafter.  
The relatively low level of the interest rate was primarily motivated by the considerations 
of bringing consumer price inflation back to the 2.5% target over the medium term. 
“Underlying inflation” was around 1% at the turn of the year 2010/2011.   
However, the outlook for inflation was dominated by two offsetting factors. On the one 
hand, inflation was considered to pick up as capacity utilisation increased, supported in 
particular by stronger growth in household demand. In early 2011 output was considered 
to be a little below potential, but by mid-2011 the output gap was estimated to have 
closed (see Chart 2.1). 
Chart 2.1: Output gap and CPIXE inflation 
                      
On the other hand, high uncertainty about economic prospects abroad, in particular in the 
euro area, weighed down on the inflation outlook through two channels: 1) Differences 
between the Norwegian and the international economy, including differences in interest 
rates, entailed a risk of a stronger NOK exchange rate; 2) The growth outlook in Norway 
became more uncertain, too.  
Source: EcoWin, First Securities
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Judging by a simple Taylor-style monetary policy rule, a normal level of capacity 
utilisation (closed output gap) suggests in isolation a normal interest rate level, whereas 
an inflation gap of 1.25% would in isolation require a key policy rate some 2 percentage 
points below normal. Any estimates of the “normal” interest rate level are associated with 
a considerable amount of uncertainty. But, if the normal level of the key policy rate in 
Norway is assumed to be around 4.5%, a key policy rate of around 2.5% appears to be 
well balanced according to a standard flexible inflation targeting strategy.  
Beside the medium-term outlook for growth and inflation, other factors seem to have 
influenced monetary policy in 2011 as well:  
• Transmission channel of monetary policy:  The spread between the key policy 
rate and market interest rates remained higher than expected during the year, 
especially in the second half of the year, leading to upward pressures on 
household borrowing costs. 
• Interest rate smoothing:  There is little purpose in reducing the key policy rate by 
a small margin for a short time if the expectation is that the policy rate will soon 
have to be raised even more. 
• Financial stability:  The consideration of guarding against the risk of a boom-bust 
cycle in household debt and house prices that could disturb activity and inflation 
further ahead was mentioned in press releases and monetary policy reports, but 
we are uncertain how much weight these considerations were given in practice.   
 
Norges Bank decided to lift the interest rate path somewhat in the March MPR and the 
key policy rate was increased to 2.25% at the Executive Board meeting in May. Prospects 
for interest rates were revised up further in the June MPR.  
However, the international economic outlook changed dramatically over the summer and 
prospects for the Norwegian key policy rate changed accordingly. Norges Bank decided 
to leave interest rates on hold in August, September and October, before reducing them 
by 50 bp to 1.75% in December.  
As the situation was different between the two periods January-June and August-
December, the discussion of the conduct of monetary policy in these two periods is done 
separately in two different sub-sections. The third sub-section examines the role of 
financial stability in monetary policy in 2011. 
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Chart 2.2: Sight deposit rate and projections 
                
 
2.1 January – June: higher capacity utilisation in Norway dominated 
 
The first monetary policy meeting of the Norges Bank Board in 2011 was on 26 
January. The Board decided to leave its key policy rate on hold at this meeting, a 
decision which was widely expected. This decision was consistent with the interest rate 
projection outlined in MPR 3/10; the baseline scenario in the Report was to keep interest 
rates on hold until mid-2011 and increase them gradually thereafter.  
In the press release following the decision, the Board put emphasis on the recovery in 
world output, which was continuing at a stronger pace than expected but was still too 
weak to reduce unemployment significantly. In Norway, household demand appeared to 
have strengthened somewhat more than expected and housing starts had picked up. The 
Board also noted that the rise in house prices had gained speed. The risk of future 
financial instability was cited as a reason not to keep the key policy rate “low for too 
long”, even though household borrowing had not increased substantially.   
However, at the meeting in January these considerations were offset by the risk of a 
stronger NOK that could keep inflation below target.  
Source: EcoWin, Swedbank
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The positive growth momentum in Norway and abroad continued in the period up to the 
next Board meeting on 16 March, at a faster pace than the Board expected in the 
previous monetary policy report. While inflation was low, the Board made a reference to 
the risk of higher-than-expected wage growth in the context of higher capacity utilisation.  
Moreover, house prices had continued to increase and there were signs of higher credit 
demand, even though there was no surge in credit growth. Against this background, the 
Executive Board noted that:  
“a low interest rate level over time could lead to financial instability” (Monetary Policy 
Report 1/11, p. 7). 
But the Board was of the opinion that these concerns had to be weighed against the 
potential effect of higher interest rates on the krone exchange rate, which could lead to 
even lower inflation.  
The Norges Bank Board revised up the interest rate projection in MPR 1/2011. One 
reason behind this move was expectations of higher interest rates among trading partners, 
which were considered to dampen the pressure on the NOK exchange rate. Moreover, the 
Board also emphasised that stronger growth prospects were expected to push up inflation 
over the medium term.  
Interestingly, when accounting for the reasons behind the changes in the interest rate path 
in the Report (Chart 2.3), the Board said that:  
“Without smoothing, technical calculations would have implied a slight, albeit brief fall 
in the key policy rate” (Monetary Policy Report 1/11, p 22) 
Because money market premiums were higher and the NOK exchange rate stronger than 
expected, the Board decided to apply interest rate smoothing to avoid unnecessary 
volatility in interest rates (first a cut, before hiking rates a few months later).  
Consequently, the key policy rate was left unchanged, as expected by all economists 
surveyed. The Board cited low inflation and a strong NOK as reasons to keep interest 
rates low. At the same time, the Board noted that: 
“The considerations of guarding against the risk of future financial imbalances that may 
disturb activity and inflation somewhat further ahead suggest that the key policy rate 
should be increased in the near term”  (Monetary Policy Report 1/11, p. 7).  
Although it was not surprising that the interest rate path would be revised up, the 
magnitude of the rise was unexpected. The message that rates were likely to be increased 
in the near term was communicated in a way that suggested that Norges Bank gave 
weight to financial stability considerations at this meeting. Expectations of future interest 
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rate hikes by Norges Bank, as implied by market rates, increased a little after the Board 
meeting.  
      
 Chart 2.3: Factors behind changes in the interest rate forecast since MPR 3/2010 
 
 
The new interest rate forecast (baseline scenario) was consistent with an interest rate hike 
“by the end of the first half of 2011” (Press release 16 March), but it was unclear whether 
the move would occur at the Board meeting in May or in June. The Executive Board 
decided to increase the key policy rate by 25 bp to 2.25% at the Board meeting on 12 
May. The decision was expected by 15 of 20 economists according to a Bloomberg poll, 
while 5 economists expected rates to be left on hold. 
The decision to raise rates was motivated by “the consideration of stabilising activity and 
inflation somewhat further ahead”, as the upturn in the Norwegian economy appeared to 
have gained a firm footing. The decisions by both the ECB and the Riksbank to increase 
rates in April facilitated the move without leading to a significantly stronger NOK 
exchange rate. The Bank also made a reference to rising house prices in the press release.   
At the same time, some key indicators of world economic growth had declined prior to 
the Board meeting in May, which questioned the sustainability of the global recovery. 
The slowdown was associated with the tensions in the Middle East, which pushed up 
energy prices, as well as the devastating Japanese earthquake, which disrupted the supply 
chain. However, both developments were considered to only temporarily reduce global 
growth. Meanwhile, the uncertainty surrounding developments in Ireland, Portugal and 
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Greece had increased since MPR 1/2011, as reflected by the surge in longer-term 
government bond yields.  
Incoming data continued to suggest that growth in global output was losing momentum in 
the period up to the Executive Board meeting on 22 June. Added to that, the turbulence 
linked to government debt in the so called “periphery” or “programme” countries of the 
euro area had intensified. As a result, international stock markets fell, expected future 
interest rates among trading partners declined and CDS prices for European financial 
institutions rose between MPR 1/2011 and MPR 2/2011 published on 22 June.  
Meanwhile, incoming data for Norway were mixed. On the one hand, growth in private 
consumption was weaker than expected and Norges Bank therefore revised down 
expectations for mainland GDP growth in 2011 slightly. On the other hand, the 
unemployment rate had fallen somewhat more than expected and a couple of surveys 
indicated that capacity utilisation had increased.  
When balancing all incoming news, the Executive Board gave particular weight to signs 
of a tightening labour market and the risk that wage and price inflation could rapidly 
accelerate if capacity utilisation rose to a high level. Added to that, the Board made a 
reference to rising home prices and rents in urban markets.  
While the Norges Bank Board kept interest rates on hold at this meeting, as expected by 
all economists surveyed, the baseline scenario in MPR 2/2011 indicated a slightly faster 
pace of interest rate hikes in the second half of the year than in the previous Report (see 
Chart 2.4). The interest rate projection was consistent with a 25 bp hike to 2.5% at the 
next meeting in August. Market interest rates increased.  
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 Chart 2.4: Factors behind changes in the interest rate forecast since MPR 1/2011 
 
 
 
2.2 August – December: financial market turbulence intensified 
 
The projections in MPR 2/2011 turned out to be too optimistic. New information over the 
summer continued to point to weaker growth in the world economy than expected, in 
particular in the euro area and in the US. Moreover, growth prospects became further 
depressed by the turbulence in the financial market, which flared up over the summer. 
Equity prices fell markedly and credit spreads widened.  
According to Executive Board’s assessment at the monetary policy meeting on 10 
August, the Norwegian economy was still growing at a robust pace broadly in line with 
what the Board had expected in June. The Board also made a reference to rising home 
prices and growth in household credit demand.  
However, these considerations were offset by the downside risks to growth going forward 
that had increased substantially due to a much more uncertain environment abroad. 
Moreover, as the price of bank funding and money market premiums had increased, 
borrowing costs for households and businesses were at risk of increasing even if the key 
policy rate were to be left on hold.  
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As a result, the Norges Bank Board decided to deviate from the baseline interest rate path 
in MPR 2/2011 and kept the key policy interest rate unchanged at 2.25%. The decision 
was expected by only 3 of the 14 economists surveyed by Bloomberg. 11 economists 
forecasted a rise to 2.5%. 
The key policy rate remained on hold also after the Board meeting on 21 September, 
which was widely expected. In the press statement the Board emphasised that prospects 
for the world economy had weakened considerably in the course of the summer and that 
external developments “are also affecting the domestic outlook”. Without presenting an 
updated interest rate forecast, the Norges Bank Board indicated that the key policy rate 
was likely to “be kept low for a longer period than expected in June”. Moreover, in the 
assessment of risks to this outlook, the Board also mentioned that the key policy rate 
might be reduced if the Norwegian economy were exposed to new major shocks.  
Prospects for lower interest rates were influenced only to a very limited extent by 
incoming data in Norway, which suggested that “growth remains robust”, according to 
the press release. Moreover, the Board noted that “unemployment has remained stable” 
and that “housing investment has shown a substantial increase and house prices are still 
on the rise”. However, the Board gave prominence to the weaker outlook in the wake of 
external developments.  
The key policy rate was also kept unchanged at the Board meeting on 19 October, a 
decision expected by 21 of the 22 economists surveyed by Bloomberg. One predicted a 
rate cut. The new interest rate projection in MPR 3/2011 was consistent with a stable key 
policy rate in Norway until the second half of 2012, although the Board emphasised risks 
around this forecast in both directions.   
The new interest rate outlook was considerably lower than in June. When accounting for 
the factors behind the downward revision, the Board mentioned expectations of weaker 
growth abroad, lower capacity utilisation in Norway, lower inflation, lower interest rates 
abroad and higher money market premiums.  
Taken together, these considerations would on balance imply a temporary cut in the key 
policy rate. However, one of the Board’s criteria for an appropriate interest rate path is to 
change the interest rate gradually. To avoid reducing the key policy rate by a small 
margin for only a short period of time, the Board included a “supplementary assessment” 
in addition to the factors mentioned above (see Chart 2.4).   
In the assessments behind the new projections, the Executive Board gave weight to the 
increased level of uncertainty surrounding developments in the global economy, 
especially in the euro area, and how this was likely to affect Norway. After all, the Board 
noted that growth in Norway had maintained momentum, even if it was slower than 
expected in June.  
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Moreover, the Board also noted that the rise in house prices had picked up and that high 
demand and housing shortages in the major cities might continue to generate pressures in 
the housing market ahead. In particular, the Board noted that: 
 “Low interest rates over time entail the risk of a buildup of imbalances. This suggests 
that the key policy rate should gradually be raised towards a more normal level” 
(Monetary Policy Report 3/2011, p. 7) 
In MPR 3/11, Norges Bank thus repeated the message emphasised in MPR 1/11: To 
lower the risk of financial imbalances, the key policy rate might have to be raised (see 
also section 3.2.3 below). However, considerations related to financial stability were not 
mentioned among the “factors behind changes in the interest rate forecast” in the Report 
(see Chart 2.5).  
Chart 2.5: Factors behind changes in the interest rate forecast since MPR 2/2011 
 
 
Finally, at the last monetary policy meeting of the year on 14 December, the Executive 
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be clearly weaker. Moreover, Norwegian money market premiums were markedly higher 
than assumed in MPR 3/2011, adding to upward pressures on borrowing costs for 
households and businesses.  
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
Q4 
2011
Q1 
2012
Q2 
2012
Q3 
2012
Q4 
2012
Q1 
2013
Q2 
2013
Q3 
2013
Q4 
2013
Q1 
2014
Q2 
2014
Q3 
2014
Q4 
2014
Interest rates abroad Prices and costs
Money market premiums Capacity utilisation
Growth abroad Supplementary assessment
Change in the interest rate forecast
Percentage points
 
 
18 
 
As a number of indicators were pointing to weaker growth ahead, the Executive Board 
was of the view that it was appropriate to reduce the key policy rate at this meeting “in 
order to guard against an economic setback and even lower inflation”.  
At the same time, the Board noted that activity in the Norwegian economy was “robust”, 
primarily driven by petroleum investment and housing construction. Moreover, the Board 
referred to rising house prices and to household debt, which was growing at a faster pace 
than household income. However, these concerns did not prevent the Bank from reducing 
the key policy rate more aggressively than the market was expecting.  
     
2.3 How much weight was given to financial stability in 2011? 
 
There is no doubt that the Norges Bank looked at indicators of financial stability, such as 
house prices and credit growth, when discussing the appropriate monetary policy stance 
in 2011. The above review of monetary policy in 2011 suggests that financial stability 
concerns were arguments in favour of raising the interest rate path in March and against 
lowering the interest rate in October. 
However, as also pointed out by Norges Bank Watch 2011, it is not clear to us that 
weight is attached to financial stability considerations in practice, in addition to the 
weight given to inflation and output stabilisation. While it is obvious that indicators of 
financial stability belong in Norges Bank’s reaction function, it is not obvious that 
Norges Bank is acting as if financial stability is also in the Bank’s objective function. In 
other words, is Norges Bank taking financial stability into account beyond its impact on 
inflation and output? For example, what happens if there appears to be a conflict between 
stabilising output and prices on the one hand, and financial stability considerations on the 
other?2
There now seems to be wide agreement that central banks have a responsibility for 
financial stability in addition to the responsibility for price and output stability (see 
discussion in the next chapter). The discussion in this chapter focuses on the role of 
financial stability for the key policy rate in 2011.  
 
                                                 
2 Differences in opinion between the members of Sveriges Riksbank’s Executive Board during 2010 and 
2011 is an example of a situation where policy makers have faced such a conflict. The debate about 
whether ECB’s market operations are justified by concerns for monetary policy or financial stability is 
another example. In retrospect, it also seems that many central banks were facing a conflict between price 
stability and financial stability when they kept interest rates low before the financial crisis, although the 
conflict was not obvious at that time (around 2004 – 2006). 
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As a starting-point for understanding Norges Bank’s strategy, it is useful to take a closer 
look at the “criteria for an appropriate interest rate path” included in the 2011 monetary 
policy reports: 
“ 
1. The interest rate should be set with a view to stabilising inflation at target or 
bringing it back to target after a deviation has occurred. The specific time horizon 
will depend on the type of disturbances to which the economy is exposed and their 
effect on the path for inflation and the real economy ahead. 
2. The interest rate path should at the same time provide a reasonable balance 
between the path for inflation and the path for overall capacity utilisation in the 
economy. 
In the assessment, potential effects of asset prices, such as property prices, equity prices 
and the krone exchange rate on stability in output, employment and inflation are also 
taken into account. 
Assuming the criteria above have been satisfied, the following additional criteria are 
useful: 
3. Interest rate adjustments should normally be gradual and consistent with the 
Bank’s previous response pattern.   
As a cross-check for interest rate setting, any substantial and systematic deviations from 
simple, robust monetary policy rules should be explained.” 
 
These criteria suggest that house prices and credit are taken into account because these 
variables influence the outlook for inflation and output. There is nothing in these criteria 
that suggests that Norges Bank is giving weight to financial stability in addition to its 
responsibility for price and output stability.  
 
At the same time, however, as the Norges Bank Board repeatedly stressed in press 
statements during 2010 and 2011:  
 
“the consideration of guarding against the risk of future financial imbalances that 
may disturb activity and inflation somewhat further ahead suggests that the 
interest rate should be brought closer to a more normal level” (Monetary Policy 
Report 1/11, p. 7).  
We see two possible but different interpretations of statements like this. According to one 
interpretation, the words “somewhat further ahead” refer to a horizon that is potentially 
somewhat longer than what most central bankers would associate with “medium-term”– 
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i.e. typically 1-3 years ahead. Then it would perhaps be fair to say that interest rate 
setting does not take financial stability into account in addition to price and output 
stability. Norges Bank just considers inflation and output stability in a longer time 
perspective than normally communicated.  
 
But another possible interpretation is that financial stability concerns do carry some extra 
weight, i.e. that financial stability is not only a part of Norges Bank’s reaction function, 
but Norges Bank acts as if financial stability also is a part of the objective function. This 
interpretation seems to be supported by the statements in MPR 3/11 that “low interest 
rates over time entail the risk of a buildup of imbalances”, which “suggests that the key 
policy rate should gradually be raised towards a more normal level”. It is difficult to see 
that a normalisation of the key policy rate would be required in the near term based on 
the forecasts for inflation and output presented. However, although the risks of 
imbalances have frequently occurred in the Bank’s statements, we are uncertain about 
whether these risks are influencing interest rate setting in practice. For instance, in the 
same report as these imbalances were metioned as a reason to raise the key policy rate 
gradually, the key policy rate was projected to remain low and stable for about a year 
ahead. And at the next meeting, the Norges Bank decided to cut the key policy rate by 50 
bp.  
 
In the first half of the year, rising home prices and the risk of future financial imbalances 
were cited as reasons for not keeping the key policy rate low for too long. But since the 
Board also projected that the increase in capacity utilisation would lead to higher 
inflation over the medium term, there was not necessarily any conflict between a 
forward-looking flexible inflation targeting strategy and financial stability concerns in the 
first half of the year. Moreover, among the factors that had contributed to changes in the 
interest rate forecasts, there were no references to financial stability concerns (see Charts 
2.3, 2.4 and 2.5). However, this does not rule out the possibility that the level of the 
interest rate path was affected by such concerns. The statement about the need to bring 
the interest rate back to “a more normal level” to lower the “risk of a buildup of 
imbalances” may suggest such a connection. 
 
In the second half of the year, indicators were pointing to weaker growth and lower 
inflationary pressures, which convinced Norges Bank to delay interest rate hikes and then 
to cut the key policy rate in December.  However, there were no signs that indicators of 
financial stability were changing course: household credit growth remained higher than 
long-term income growth and home prices were rising quickly (see Chart 2.6). In fact, the 
Norges Bank Board noted in October that “the rise in house prices had picked up”.  
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          Chart 2.6 House prices deflated by CPI. Indices, 1995=100 
    
In the second half of 2011, a conflict seemed to have emerged between the considerations 
of output and inflation stability on the one hand and financial stability considerations on 
the other. The decision to abandon a planned interest rate increase in August and then to 
cut the key policy rate in December may indicate that financial stability considerations 
were not very important for monetary policy. The size of the interest rate cut in 
December took financial markets by surprise, which suggests that Norges Bank placed 
less weight on financial stability than expected. At the same time, financial stability 
concerns may have prevented an even more aggressive easing of monetary policy in the 
second half of 2011. 
 
2.4 NBW view 
 
During 2011, central banks almost all over the world have struggled with the dilemma of 
how to balance various risks. Low levels of capacity utilisation have been an argument in 
favour of lower interest rates, while high debt levels have been the argument against. As 
regards the primary objective of monetary policy, price stability, central banks in 
different countries have faced quite different problems. Countries with depreciating 
currencies have experienced higher-than-targeted inflation rates, while inflation has 
persistently been below target in countries with appreciating exchange rates. The balance 
of risks shifted during 2011. In the beginning of the year, forecasts of economic growth 
were still relatively optimistic and there was reason to expect that interest rates would 
Source: EcoWin, First Securities
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gradually increase. During the second half of the year, the outlook for the world 
economy, especially Europe, became much more negative. 
 
In comparison with other countries, Norway has been in a very favourable, albeit still 
difficult, situation. The level of capacity utilisation was considered to be normal, which in 
isolation would suggest that the interest rate level should be normal too. However, 
inflation has been, and has been expected to remain, low. Norges Bank has explicitly 
stated that looking at inflation alone, it would have been possible to lower the interest rate 
more and earlier than in December. 
 
Whether one sees monetary policy in Norway as well balanced during 2011 or not 
depends on whether financial stability should be viewed as an independent objective for 
the central bank or not. If one supports such an objective, the Norges Bank could have 
increased the interest rate earlier and more during the first half of 2011 and refrained 
from lowering the key policy rate by 50 bp in December. If one does not accept that 
financial stability should be an objective for monetary policy, but that it is enough to 
consider house prices and credit as part of the Bank’s reaction function, monetary policy 
in 2011 more clearly appears to have been well balanced. 
 
Careful judgment is necessary in situations when there is considerable uncertainty about 
developments in the world economy and policymakers face difficult choices, and it is 
difficult to argue that Norges Bank has made any major mistakes. But in the view of 
NBW, there is considerable room for improvement in Norges Bank’s communication of 
monetary policy. The role of financial stability for monetary policy needs to be clarified, 
in particular whether financial stability is in the Bank’s reaction function or in the 
objective function. 
 
A speech by Governor Gjedrem in autumn 2009 (Experiences with the financial crisis) 
suggests that financial stability is not part of the objective function: 
 
“The Ministry of Finance has not suggested, and Norges Bank has not requested, that 
house prices should be given particular weight.” 
 
 
If an extra weight should be given to financial stability in monetary policy – and we have 
sympathy for that idea – Norges Bank could, in principle, have raised the interest rate 
earlier and more during the first half of 2011. The cut in December could then be 
questioned. But the exact size and timing of interest rate movements is a quantitative 
problem that cannot be addressed until the qualitative question about the central bank’s 
responsibility for financial stability has been clarified.  
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3. LINKS BETWEEN MONETARY POLICY AND FINANCIAL 
STABILITY  
 
The traditional and simple strategy of flexible inflation targeting does not imply that 
financial stability is irrelevant in the pursuit of monetary policy. But it does imply that, at 
least in normal times, it is relevant only to the extent that financial instability would 
destabilise output and inflation, and that financial stability is not an independent 
monetary policy target when setting the interest rate. 
 
This monetary policy strategy has, however, been challenged by the international 
economic downturn over the last few years: 
- Financial instability has been a more important source of fluctuations in inflation 
and output than standard forecasting models have been able to capture; 
- Central banks’ decisions have been influenced by concerns about financial 
stability, seemingly in addition to their objectives for inflation and economic 
activity;3
- Central banks have taken measures to promote financial stability that have 
affected the stability of inflation and output;  
 
- It has sometimes been unclear whether central banks’ decisions have been 
primarily directed by a financial stability objective or by the objectives of price 
and output stability. 
The experiences from the recent crisis (primarily in the US and Europe) have led to 
proposals for how policy makers should “rethink macroeconomic policy” (Blanchard et 
al., 2010) and “rethink central banking” (Eichengreen et al., 2011). It is too early to draw 
any strong and definite policy conclusions from this ongoing rethinking, but NBW 2012 
recommends Norges Bank to be as open as possible – in line with Norges Bank’s 
generally high degree of transparency – about how the links to financial stability 
influence monetary policy. 
 
Looking for potential improvements in Norges Bank’s analyses and communication 
about the links between monetary policy and financial stability, the view of NBW 2012 is 
that it is useful to think about these issues in a sequence of steps.4
                                                 
3 We consider the decisions taken by ECB, Sveriges Riksbank and Norges Bank during 2011 as examples 
of this. 
 First, how does the 
degree of financial stability influence the effects of monetary policy on inflation and 
output, i.e. the so-called transmission mechanism? This question is relevant even if one 
wants to stick to the traditional and simple strategy of flexible inflation targeting (where 
financial stability is not a separate objective for monetary policy). Second, does the 
4 This also appears to be roughly the scheme followed in Norges Bank’s internal MAFI project. 
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central bank have an objective for financial stability that is intended to influence 
monetary policy also under normal circumstances? Third, if the central bank has some 
responsibility for financial stability, how should this task be separated from similar tasks 
undertaken by other authorities, e.g. the FSA? 
 
3.1 Financial stability and the transmission mechanism 
 
Monetary policy influences aggregate inflation and output via the supply of credit. Under 
normal circumstances, the central bank implements monetary policy through variations in 
short-term interest rates on loans to (and/or deposits from) private banks. Under normal 
circumstances, changes in the central bank’s key policy rate(s) are more or less directly 
reflected in private banks’ interest rates (and credit volumes) to households and firms. 
One aspect of financial instability is that these links break down or at least change. If so, 
this will influence the central bank’s monetary policy even if financial stability as such is 
not an objective of monetary policy. 
 
The relevance of financial instability for monetary policy in Norway is illustrated in 
Chart 3.1. From mid-2009 to mid-2011, the spread between the key policy rate and the 3-
month money market rate mostly fluctuated in the interval 0.5 – 0.7 per cent. In early 
2009, the spread was higher and more volatile, reflecting instability in financial markets 
that weakened the transmission of monetary policy to banks’ lending rates. During the 
second half of 2011, the spread increased again.  
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                  Chart 3.1 Spread between money market rate and key policy rate 
               
 
In its communication, Norges Bank often comments on the development of risk 
premiums and spreads between the key policy rate and market rates. In the view of NBW 
2012, it would be useful if Norges Bank could be more explicit on how risk premiums 
and spreads affect the forecasts for inflation, output and the key policy rate. 
 
To make this recommendation a little more specific, consider the change in Norges 
Bank’s views on the money market premium during 2011 (the difference between the 3-
month money market rate and the expected key policy rate). In March and June, this 
premium was expected to decline by between 50 bp and 25 bp between 2011 and 2012. It 
was stated that this, in isolation, implied an increase in the policy rate. In October, the 
estimated money market premium was revised upwards by 50 bp, for both 2011 and 2012 
(and by 25 bp for 2013 and 2014). In principle, this revision – “in isolation” – could 
explain the entire 50 bp cut in the interest rate in December. The large quantitative 
importance of the money market premium is obvious in the decomposition of the changes 
in the interest rate forecast (see Chart 2.4). But this potentially very important factor is 
not so conspicuous in Norges Bank’s verbal explanations. In particular, instability in the 
transmission mechanism is not included among Norges Bank’s four main “criteria for an 
appropriate interest rate path”. This also implies that no explicit discussion of changes in 
spreads is included in the otherwise very thorough and illuminating section on 
“assessment of the interest rate path” in the MPR. If the links between spreads in market 
Source: EcoWin, First Securities
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interest rates and monetary policy had been better explained, perhaps the policy decision 
in December would have been less surprising. 
 
It would also be informative if Norges Bank could explain under what circumstances 
policy instruments other than the ordinary policy rate (e.g. “credit easing”, “quantitative 
easing”) are likely to be used in the implementation of monetary policy, depending on 
how the transmission mechanisms are affected by conditions in financial markets. 
 
3.1 Monetary policy and the objective of financial stability 
 
3.2.1 Norges Bank’s mandate 
 
Norges Bank has to monitor financial stability to make decisions on the appropriate 
monetary policy to stabilise inflation and output. Financial stability may also be an 
objective in its own right, but Norges Bank’s responsibilities in this area appear to be 
somewhat unclear. 
 
The Norges Bank Act states that the Bank shall “promote an efficient payment system”. 
According to the information on the Bank’s website, Norges Bank’s mandate and core 
responsibilities  include “promoting robust and efficient payment systems and financial 
markets”. According to a closely related formulation on the financial stability page, 
Norges Bank shall “promote financial stability and contribute to robust and efficient 
financial infrastructures and payment systems”.  
 
The text also includes a definition of financial stability: 
 
“Financial stability implies a financial system that is robust to disturbances and 
is capable of ensuring funding, executing payments and distributing 
risk efficiently. Experience shows that financial instability builds up in periods of 
strong credit growth and asset price inflation.” 
Apparently there are official presentations of Norges Bank’s responsibilities that are 
somewhat wider than the formulations in the Norges Bank Act. But it is not easy, based 
on the quotations above, to decide whether financial stability is (1) exactly the same thing 
as “an efficient payment system” (the formulation used in the Norges Bank Act), or (2) 
whether this is a separate objective, in addition to price and output stability, or whether 
financial stability alone is viewed as a prerequisite for price and output stability. In the 
view of NBW 2012, there is a need for more transparency about these issues. 
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It deserves to be noted that although Norges Bank’s mandate regarding financial stability 
can be said to be somewhat unclear, it does in some sense have a higher legal status than 
price stability. Price stability is not an objective mentioned in the Norges Bank Act. This 
objective instead appears in a separate Regulation on Monetary Policy.  
 
3.2.2 The international discussion 
 
Bernanke (2011) notes that 
 
“in the decades prior to the crisis, monetary policy had come to be viewed as the 
principal function of central banks; their role in preserving financial stability was 
not ignored, but it was downplayed to some extent. The financial crisis has 
changed all that. Policies to enhance financial stability and monetary policy are 
now seen as co-equal responsibilities of central banks.” 
 
Eichengreen et al. (2011, p. 3) are more vocal, arguing that  
 
“the traditional separation, in which monetary policy targets price stability and 
regulatory policies target financial stability, and the two sets of policies operate 
largely independent of each other, is no longer tenable.” 
 
Eichengreen et al. (2011, p. 3) moreover discuss traditional arguments against letting 
financial stability impact interest rate setting, but conclude that (p. 6) 
 
“inflation-targeting central banks may want to stray below target when 
conditions are “boom-like” – when rapid asset price growth is accompanied by 
substantial credit expansion – since policy would otherwise become asymmetric 
and exacerbate macroeconomic volatility.” 
 
This is consistent with Woodford’s (2012, p. 7) views: 
 
 “I believe that it is appropriate for a ‘flexible inflation targeting’ central bank to 
 endeavour to balance financial stability objectives against both its price stability 
 objective and its concern for output-gap stabilisation, when choosing among 
 alternative short-run paths for the economy at a given conjuncture.” 
 
Bryant, Henderson and Becker (2011), on the other hand, argue that there is a “rough 
consensus” that 
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“Monetary policy is relatively better suited for achieving stability of inflation and 
  resource utilization, and macroprudential policies are relatively better suited for 
 achieving financial stability”.5
 
 
But they also note that  
 
 “The strong opposition to the general idea of leaning against the wind,  
  interpreted broadly as putting greater emphasis on financial stability, has  
 softened.” 
 
 
NBW 2012 draws two conclusions from the international discussion: 
i. Although the issue has not been sorted out analytically once and for all, there 
now seems to be wide agreement that central banks have a responsibility for 
financial stability in addition to the responsibility for price and output 
stability. That is, price, output and financial stability are three different 
objectives and they are not perfectly correlated. 
ii. There is less agreement among experts whether this also implies that 
monetary policy, defined as the setting of a short-term interest rate, should be 
influenced by the degree of financial stability. 
 
Against this background, Norges Bank cannot, on theoretical grounds, be criticised for 
having given some weight to financial stability in its interest rate decisions in 2011. How 
important financial stability has been for monetary policy in practice is however unclear, 
as pointed out in the previous chapter. Furthermore, the argument that it may 
theoretically be justifiable to give some weight to a financial stability target in monetary 
policy does not, of course, imply that such considerations were also justified in Norway 
during 2011. Again, it is NBW’s opinion that there is a need to improve policy analysis 
and communication, although we are less convinced that better analysis and 
communication would have changed policy during 2011. 
  
                                                 
5 "Svensson (2012) makes the same argument in a comment on Woodford (2012)." 
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3.2.3 The discussion in Norway 
 
As regards Norges Bank, there have been previous evaluations of the interaction between 
financial stability and monetary policy. Fridriksson (2010, p. 9) concludes that 
 
”The contribution of FST in the meetings where it participates might possibly be 
better coordinated with or integrated into the general preparations in the PPO; 
some of the analysis presented by the FST might perhaps be a logical part of the 
analytical preparatory work in PPO.” 
 
FST (Norges Bank Financial Stability; PPO is the Monetary Policy wing) now seems to 
be more integrated in the decision on which interest rate to set. Previously FST gave 
advice on an appropriate interest rate decision, based on financial stability considerations 
only. Currently, FST provides specific advice on the appropriate interest rate, which 
forms part of the background for the advice on which interest rate the Executive Board 
should decide on. In this way FST has been given a more integrated role with more direct 
involvement in the monetary policy process.  
 
Norges Bank Watch 2011 saw room for improvement in the way Norges Bank 
communicated the influence of financial stability considerations in setting the interest 
rate, writing that (p.5) 
 
”Norges Bank argues that both financial stability and price stability 
considerations should be important when making monetary policy decisions. Yet, 
it is not clear to us what weight is attached to each consideration and how 
specific analysis and recommendations from financial stability is integrated into 
the actual monetary policy framework.  
 
The committee suggests that Norges Bank makes it clearer as to how the issues of 
major concern in financial stability influence monetary policy decisions in 
practice. In particular, judgment as to how the risk of future financial imbalances 
may (or may not) disturb activity and inflation somewhat further ahead could be 
more emphasized.”  
 
On the one hand, Norges Bank seems to subscribe to the traditional view that indicators 
of financial instability only matter in so far as they affect the forecasts of inflation and 
GDP . In their “Criteria for an appropriate interest rate path” which has been included in 
all the 2011 monetary policy reports, the Bank states that 
“The interest rate path should at the same time provide a reasonable balance 
between the path for inflation and the path for overall capacity utilization in the 
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economy. In the assessment, potential effects of asset prices, such as property 
prices, equity prices and the krone exchange rate on stability in output, 
employment and inflation are also taken into account.” 
Moreover, in commenting on the central bank’s loss function, the bank notes that  
“Situations may arise where the weight will be given to considerations other than 
those expressed in the simple loss function. In certain situations, for example, a 
more aggressive interest rate response than usual may be necessary to prevent 
particularly adverse outcomes.” 
One interpretation of this may be that Norges Bank sticks to the view that in interest rate 
setting financial stability only matters in normal times through its effects (via various 
transmission mechanisms) on inflation and the output gap in the loss function, but also 
that there may be extraordinary situations where financial stability becomes an objective 
in itself and the normal loss function is sidestepped. 
But on the other hand, in MPR 3/2011 Norges Bank argues that (p. 8) 
“Low inflation suggests in isolation that the key policy rate should be lowered. 
But the key policy rate is already low. Capacity utilisation is close to a normal 
level. Low interest rates over time entail the risk of a buildup of imbalances. This 
suggests that the key policy rate should gradually be raised towards a more 
normal level.” 
Reading this, the NBW 2012 committee gets the impression that Norges Bank also gives 
some weight to financial stability under relatively normal circumstances. In light of the 
simple loss function, the interest rate should have been lowered in June and October 2011 
(since inflation pulls in that direction while capacity utilisation is close to normal). But 
this is not done, since it entails the risk of a buildup of imbalances. In MPR 3/2011 
interest rate smoothing and a “supplementary assessment” is explicitly mentioned, in 
MPR 2/2011 interest rate smoothing is also applied but less explicitly. We suspect that 
financial stability concerns were relevant on both these occasions.  
Thus, this gives the impression that the interest rate is set in light of financial stability 
considerations that do not arise from the variables in the loss function, and thus that 
Norges Bank does not subscribe to the traditional view of inflation-targeting central 
banks (but to the more flexible policy advocated by e.g. Woodford above). Alternatively, 
the situation in June 2011 may be an example of an extraordinary situation in which the 
loss function should be put aside. If that was the case, this should have been stated 
explicitly. 
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3.3 Norges Bank’s and other authorities’ responsibilities for financial stability 
 
Most economists agree that financial institutions have an incentive to take on too much 
risk compared to what is socially optimal. A main reason for this is the asymmetric 
distribution of gains and losses; if risk pays off, the financial institutions receive the 
gains, if risk does not pay off, then the government may take part of the losses. The 
reason for this is explicit or implicit government guarantees. 
 
The traditional view is that in order to limit such excessive risk-taking, ‘microprudential’ 
overview and regulation is necessary. The term ‘microprudential’ refers to a regime 
where each financial institution is viewed in isolation, and thus overview and regulation 
can be thought of as a partial equilibrium approach. 
 
Due to recent experience, many now argue that ‘macroprudential’ regulation is also 
necessary. Behind the term ‘macroprudential’ is a concern that there are systemic risks 
that affect the whole financial system and the macro economy. In this view 
microprudential regulation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for financial 
stability. A general equilibrium approach to financial regulation is necessary. Such an 
approach implies that the external effects that decisions in financial institutions have on 
other institutions are taken into account, and that the effects on the macro economy as a 
whole are considered. A particular implication of this is that macroprudential regulation 
is time-varying; for instance that capital requirements depend on overall macroeconomic 
conditions. For an overview and discussion of different macroprudential tools, see 
Hanson et al. (2011). 
 
A key question in the institutional design of macroprudential tools is who should 
administer these new policy instruments. Several observers have also contended that 
these new tools have further implications also for the transparency and independence of 
the institution(s) that administer them, a point to which we return below. 
 
As regards who should be responsible for macroprudential policy, the discussion centres 
on whether the central bank  or another institution outside the central bank should be 
responsible. See for example the discussion in Natvik (2011). There are also institutional 
designs that aim to combine the two, for instance the proposal by NOU 2011:1 to let the 
FSA undertake policy decisions, while Norges Bank plays a key role in advising on 
which policy should be undertaken. The Commission writes the following:  
 
”The Commission proposes that Norges Bank is provided a clearer formal 
responsibility to periodically provide accurate advice on the use of discretionary 
measures in macro regulation of the financial system. Norges Bank should 
provide the advice in the form of publicly available submissions to the Ministry of 
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Finance and the FSA. The FSA should explain what it does to follow up the 
recommendations from Norges Bank, or why it has decided to not follow up the 
recommendations. The Ministry of Finance should explain the recommendations, 
assessments and actions to the Parliament, for example in the form of a report.” 
 
 
A key starting-point in the discussion of who should be responsible for macroprudential 
policy is policy coordination. The tools of macroprudential policy will be dependent on, 
and will affect, the macroeconomic stance. In the same way, the optimal interest rate will 
be dependent on, and will affect, the macroeconomic stance. It follows that 
macroprudential policy will depend on the interest rate, and vice versa. Institutional 
design must take this into account. 
 
A simple and obvious solution to this is to have one institution, in this case the central 
bank, decide both macroprudential policy and the interest rate. In this case one achieves, 
at least in theory, the optimal policy mix of the policy instruments and avoids strategic 
interactions between different policy makers. 
 
There are, however, also arguments against such an institutional design. One such 
argument is related to the Condorcet jury theorem: with uncertainty as regards the 
optimal policy, the expected quality of policy is better when formed as the average 
opinion of multiple actors. The reason for this is simply that with uncertainty the mean 
opinion has a lower variance around the true state of the economy than the opinion of a 
single actor. 
 
A counter-argument could be that the solution to such policy uncertainty is not to let 
multiple institutions decide policy, but rather to let multiple persons within the institution 
that decides policy be allocated decision-making power. In this way one can achieve the 
Condorcet gain without losing the coordination gain.  
 
Such an argument clearly has relevance. It shows that the Condorcet argument per se is 
not sufficient to argue for a separation of policy between different institutions. For such 
an argument to be valid, one must in addition argue that allocating decision-making 
power to multiple members within one institution does not achieve the same Condorcet 
gains as allocating decision-making power to multiple institutions. There are at least two 
arguments why this may be the case. Then first one relates to ‘groupthink’, the 
phenomenon that agents within a group may develop a way of interacting that leads them 
to make the same, or similar, mistakes. A policy implication of such groupthink may be 
that Condorcet gains are best achieved by allocating decision-making power to multiple 
institutions.  
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The second argument relates to information differences; for instance, because those 
members of e.g. the central bank Executive Board who have this engagement as a part-
time position are on average less well informed than those who are board members on a 
full-time basis. In such a situation, the quality of information may be improved by either 
allocating decision-making power to an additional institution or by reducing the 
information differences between the members of the central bank Executive Board, a 
point to which we return below. 
 
Another argument against having the central bank decide all the policy instruments could 
be that of independence from politicians. Tightening capital requirements may not always 
be popular or politically desirable in the short term, and thus such a policy may be prone 
to time inconsistency problems in a similar way to interest rate policy. Given this, a goal 
of the institutional design may be to limit the possibility of political interference.  
 
It is not, however, quite clear in which direction this latter argument pulls. On the one 
hand, it could be argued that having all instruments in one institution makes it tempting to 
concentrate political pressure against this institution, while if policy instruments are 
allocated to different institutions, this may be more difficult. This seems to be the 
position of Eichengreen et al. (2011, p. 10), who argue that if the central bank is 
responsible for macroprudential regulation  
 
“One disadvantage is that it makes the central bank more susceptible to political 
interference.” 
 
On the other hand, it could also be argued that having the central bank decide on 
macroprudential policy reduces susceptibility to political interference, because when 
policy instruments are collected at one institution it becomes more transparent who is 
responsible. 
 
An additional argument that could be used against having the central bank decide on 
macroprudential policy is that of the concentration of power and workload. First, given 
that the central bank is an independent institution, it may be seen as unhealthy to allocate 
even more power than this institution already has. In general, it could be argued that the 
more checks and balances there are within the central bank, the more power it can be 
allocated. But the checks and balances internally in Norges Bank could be seen as weaker 
than those in many other central banks, since the external members of the Executive 
Board of Norges Bank only hold part-time positions. This gives the two internal members 
at the Executive Board, the governor and the deputy governor, considerable agenda-
setting powers. Moreover, it could be argued that with the current organisation of Norges 
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Bank, where the Executive Board is responsible for NBIM and thus has additional 
responsibilities compared with other central banks, allocating an even larger workload to 
an Executive Board where 5 out of 7 are part-time members adds on too much work 
(given that the current institutional design of Norges Bank is kept unchanged). 
 
Internationally, there seems to be a growing consensus that macroprudential policies need 
to be closely integrated with traditional monetary policies. For example, Bryant et al. 
(2011, p. 94) note that  
 
“The view that decisions for monetary policy and for macroprudential policies 
should be managed in a more integrated, coordinated fashion is gaining ground 
among those who must make these decisions.” 
 
Eichengreen et al. (2011, p. 9) are explicit in such a recommendation, writing that 
 
“While there is little consensus as to the best model, our contention that financial 
stability should be a core objective of the central bank increases the weight of 
arguments for giving central banks primary responsibility for regulatory matters. 
If central banks have a mandate to ensure financial stability and also the powers 
needed to wield macroprudential corrective instruments, they can optimally 
choose trade-offs between the use of the interest rate instrument and 
macroprudential measures.” 
 
This recommendation is consistent with the conclusion drawn by Goodhart (2011): “The 
M-PA [macro-prudential authority] has to come under the aegis of the CB”. 
 
Several observers who argue that macroprudential policy should be undertaken by the 
central bank contend that this has implications for central bank independence. For 
instance, Blanchard et al. (2010, p. 12-13) argue that: 
  
“If one accepts the notion that, together, monetary policy and regulation provide 
a large set of cyclical tools, this raises the issue of how coordination is achieved 
between the monetary and the regulatory authorities, or whether the central bank 
should be in charge of both. 
 
The increased trend toward separation of the two may well have to be reversed. 
Central banks are an obvious candidate as macroprudential regulators. They are 
ideally positioned to monitor macroeconomic developments, and in several 
countries they already regulate the banks. “Communication debacles during the 
crisis (for example on the occasion of the bailout of Northern Rock) point to the 
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problems involved in coordinating the actions of two separate agencies. And the 
potential implications of monetary policy decisions for leverage and risk taking 
also favor the centralization of macroprudential responsibilities within the central 
bank. Against this solution, two arguments were given in the past against giving 
such power to the central bank. The first was that the central bank would take a 
“softer” stance against inflation, since interest rate hikes may have a detrimental 
effect on bank balance sheets. The second was that the central bank would have a 
more complex mandate, and thus be less accountable. Both arguments have merit, 
and at a minimum, imply a need for further transparency if the central bank is 
given responsibility for regulation. The alternative, that is, separate monetary and 
regulatory authorities, seems worse.”  
 
Also, a similar view is echoed by Eichengreen et al. (2011, p. 10) who find that  
 
“If, on balance, the decision to make the central bank the macroprudential 
supervisor, this approach should go hand in hand with measures to strengthen its 
independence from political pressure.” 
 
Thus, according to recent international literature, the view on the allocation of 
macroprudential tools cannot be viewed independent of the institutional design of the 
central bank. Moreover, allocating new policy instruments to the central bank may have 
implications in the direction of making the central bank more independent. In turn, 
making the central bank more independent may also, in particular in Norway where 5 of 
7 Executive Board members are part-time, have implications in the direction of 
strengthening the checks and balances within Norges Bank.  
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3.4 NBW view 
 
As we have already pointed out, in Chapter 2, we think Norges Bank should improve its 
communication about the relevance of financial stability for monetary policy. In this 
chapter we have stressed that Norges Bank’s formal responsibility for financial stability 
must be clarified, something which is not under the control of Norges Bank. But the Bank 
can clarify how changes in the degree of financial stability (e.g., via the money market 
premium) influence the Bank’s forecasts and policy decisions. The degree of financial 
stability affects the transmission of monetary policy irrespective of whether the central 
bank has a separate objective for financial stability or not. During 2011 the money market 
premium was initially expected to decline, but instead it increased during the second half 
of the year. If such changes in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy were 
included among the listed main criteria for an appropriate interest rate path, they would 
also be part of the regular assessments of the interest rate path. This would be an 
improvement in Norges Bank’s communication (and perhaps analysis). 
Many international experts suggest that the central bank should not only pay attention to 
financial stability because it affects the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, but 
that financial stability should also be an objective in its own right. There is less 
agreement about whether financial stability should be controlled by monetary policy or 
primarily by other instruments. Many international experts want to give the central bank, 
rather than the FSA, the primary responsibility for macroprudential policies. In line with 
many (but not all) international experts, NBW holds the view that Norges Bank rather 
than the FSA should be responsible for macroprudential policies. But there are many 
difficult issues related to this issue that remain to be solved, as has been thoroughly 
elucidated in an excellent recent report from the Ministry of Finance, Norges Bank and 
the FSA. 
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4. THE INDEPENDENCE OF NORGES BANK 
 
4.1 Central bank independence – general arguments 
 
The question of institutional design when citizens or the government delegate political 
decision-making power has been much discussed. A widespread view is that when 
decision-making power is delegated to legislative bodies or institutions, then the role of 
checks and balances becomes crucial. Such a view has a long history, and was clearly 
articulated as early as in 1788 by James Madison in the Federalist Papers, where he 
wrote: 
 
“In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great 
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the 
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the 
people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has 
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.” (Federalist Papers, # 51, 
1788). 
 
Madison's `auxiliary precautions' later came to be known as checks and balances, and 
included a separation of powers between the executive and a bicameral legislature. The 
initial reasoning behind checks and balances focused on the case where citizens, through 
elections, delegated power to politicians. Later reasoning on checks and balances has 
expanded to the case where the government delegates decision-making power to 
independent institutions. 
 
The modern literature on checks and balances, such as Persson et al. (1997, 2000), shows 
in formal models that checks and balances are desirable because such an institutional 
design brings policy more into line with the preferences of those who delegate political 
power. Acemoglu et al. (2011) show different ways of designing checks and balances, 
how they improve the quality of policy, but how despite this they may not constitute an 
equilibrium institutional design because some groups or actors may see it in their own 
interests to dismantle them. 
 
The government’s temptation to generate excessive inflation in the short run (e.g., in 
order to raise more seignorage or to stimulate aggregate demand) may require limits to be 
set on the immediate political influence on the central bank. It may be in society’s 
interests to delegate monetary policy to an independent central bank that gives relatively 
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high weight to stabilising inflation.6
 
 But central bank independence is a matter of degree, 
both theoretically and in practice. The central bank’s mandate may be formulated so as to 
give the bank a high or low degree of independence. Similarly, the rules governing how 
the central bank’s board and governor are appointed obviously affect the degree of 
independence. But the mandate and the appointment rules can always be changed. If 
politicians can easily change the rules, the central bank may be less independent in 
practice than formally. 
In general, the more independent an institution such as the central bank is, the more 
checks and balances are desirable within the institution. Also, the greater responsibilities 
such an institution has for policy, the more important are checks and balances. There are 
several reasons for this. First, by balancing power within the institution, control is 
ensured even if policy has been delegated. Second, checks and balances prevent single 
actors or groups from tilting the institution in their own personal direction. Third, 
independent institutions without internal checks are prone to inefficiency – thus granting 
monopoly rights to decide policy may also come with a cost. Checks and balances act as 
a substitute for the efficiency-enhancing effects of the missing competition. 
 
Rules that enhance transparency can provide checks and balances. Transparency can 
accomplish this in many different ways. First, if the central bank is very transparent about 
its analyses and decision-making processes, financial markets and the public at large will 
be able to verify the actual degree of independence. Do politicians seem to have any 
direct influence on the central bank’s decisions? Second, transparency makes it easier for 
the central bank’s principal (the government or the parliament) to hold the central bank 
accountable for its actions, ensuring that the institution does not become more 
independent than intended. Third, transparency may give the central bank incentives to be 
more efficient. 
 
4.2 Central bank independence – Norway 
 
The Ministry of Finance and Norges Bank both view Norges Bank as very independent. 
Still, there are several issues relating to central bank independence where it could be 
argued, at least on paper, that Norges Bank is not among the most independent of central 
banks. 
 
The Norges Bank Act of 24 May 1985 (with subsequent amendments) is the main 
legislation governing the organisation and operation of Norges Bank. The Executive 
Board of Norges Bank has the governor as its chairman, the deputy governor as deputy 
                                                 
6 See Rogoff (1985) for a theoretical example. 
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chairman, five external part-time members and two external part-time alternate members 
(that attend all meetings and seminars). The governor and the deputy governor are 
appointed for six-year terms which can be renewed once (for each position). The 
remaining members of the Executive Board are appointed for four-year terms. These 
members may serve several terms with a maximum total appointment of twelve years. All 
appointments are made by the government (the King in Council).  
 
As all members of the Board are appointed by the government, and also depend on the 
government for renewal of their terms, it could be argued that the Executive Board of 
Norges Bank is not very independent. Such an institutional arrangement is in contrast to 
for instance Sweden, where the executive board and the governor are appointed by a 
Governing Council appointed by parliament and where the government has no direct 
influence over these appointments.  
 
The relatively long terms for the governor and the deputy governor can be seen as 
making the central bank more independent. The fact that the whole Executive Board is 
not appointed simultaneously pulls in the same direction. 
 
The Executive Board normally meets every third week and is the executive and advisory 
authority in connection with the core tasks of Norges Bank. The Executive Board 
functions as a unified group and the members are collectively responsible for the 
decisions of the Bank. The external members hold part-time positions. 
As regards monetary policy decisions, there is a significant asymmetry between the two 
internal members and the rest of the Board. The governor and the deputy governor work 
full time together with the staff of the Bank to prepare and propose an interest rate 
decision, while the external members have no separate staff and have other full.-time jobs 
outside Norges Bank. If the Board is meant to play an active part in the interest rate 
decision, this is a challenging form of organisation. This is especially so since the Board 
has additional very important duties, such as the responsibility for NBIM.  
There are potential downsides to this way of organising the interaction between the 
external and internal members of the Executive Board. The role of the external members 
of the Executive Board as a checks and balances institution is weakened when the 
institutional design is so asymmetric. Moreover, when the workload of the external 
members is large relative to the time they are meant to use for this work, it becomes more 
difficult to ensure that the background information underlying the interest rate decision 
holds top quality. 
 
The governors and deputy governors have in several cases been economists with a 
background as active politicians. However, the most recent governors and deputy 
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governors have not had such an active political background. Traditionally, the governors 
and deputy governors have had a background as government officials and in Norges 
Bank. The ties to the Ministry of Finance seem particularly strong. A governor without 
work experience in the ministry has not been appointed since the Second World War. 
 
The link between the Ministry of Finance and Norges Bank is not just an informal one. 
Section 2 of the Norges Bank Act states: 
 
“Before the Bank makes any decision of special importance, the matter shall be 
submitted to the ministry.” 
 
It is not specified which decisions that are of special importance. There seems to have 
been some development in this over time. For instance, it used to be the case that when it 
was decided that some coins were to be withdrawn from circulation, this was a decision 
submitted to the ministry, but recently such decisions have not been submitted.  
 
The main decision submitted on a regular basis is the decision on the interest rate. The 
day before the Executive Board meets to decide on the interest rate, the governor and the 
deputy governor visit the Ministry of Finance to inform the ministry about the interest 
rate they are going to recommend to the Executive Board. The Executive Board then 
meets the following morning and decides on the interest rate. The Ministry of Finance is 
then informed about the decision via a letter at 1 p.m. and the interest rate decision 
becomes public information one hour later.  
 
According to the Ministry of Finance and Norges Bank, this system does not imply that 
the ministry has a “hands-on approach” to the interest rate decision. When the proposed 
interest rate is submitted, the ministry never interferes. Thus it could be argued that this is 
just an arrangement that makes information exchange effective and allows the ministry to 
be informed before the market. This may be desirable, for instance because the Minister 
of Finance may have to answer questions about the background for the interest rate 
decision and thus needs to be well informed. 
 
On the other hand, it could be argued that having Norges Bank submit any decision of 
special importance to the Ministry of Finance limits the independence of Norges Bank. In 
particular this can be said to be so in light of the continuation of Section 2 of the Norges 
Bank Act, which states: 
 
“The King in Council may adopt resolutions regarding the operations of the 
Bank. Such resolutions may take the form of general rules or instructions in 
individual cases. The Bank shall be given the opportunity to state its opinion 
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before such resolutions are passed. The Storting shall be notified of resolutions as 
soon as possible.” 
Thus, according to the Norges Bank Act, the government may change decisions made by 
Norges Bank.  
 
There are several issues to be discussed here. First, if the main reason for this system is 
that the Ministry of Finance shall be well informed, this does not seem to be reflected in 
the wording of the Act. If conveying information were the main issue, this could be 
achieved through alternative arrangements. For instance, in Sweden the ministry is 
informed about the interest rate decision after it has been taken, but before it becomes 
public.7
 
  
Second, it is important to realise that the only instance where this section of the Act has 
been used was in 2001 with the introduction of an inflation-targeting regime. Clearly, this 
was not an instance where the government used this to change a decision made by Norges 
Bank, but rather to formalise a policy Norges Bank saw as an improvement. Thus the 
government has never used Section 2 of the Norges Bank Act to instruct Norges Bank to 
change policy against its will. Against this background, it could be argued that the 
combination of submit any decision of special importance and instructions in individual 
cases has very limited practical consequences.  
 
On the other hand, such a view is not in accordance with basic game theory literature on 
policy interaction between different public bodies (such as legislative bargaining models 
where Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Diermeier and Feddersen (1998) are important 
contributions). As the literature makes clear, if one body has to have the approval of 
another to undertake policy decisions, the policy proposal will be adjusted to fit. Hence, 
there will never be instruction. But this does not imply that the body with the right to 
instruct does not influence policy; on the contrary, the observation that the right to 
instruct policy is not used may mean that influence on policy is in fact very strong. 
 
Third, it should be noted that using the right to instruct implies that Norges Bank has the 
right to state its view and that notifying the parliament is required. It follows from this 
that if the government gives instructions to Norges Bank in the event of disagreement, it 
is a process that will be public. This may make it rather costly for the government to use 
its right to instruct in a situation where it disagrees with the policy of Norges Bank. 
 
                                                 
7 It may of course be argued that, formally, the Ministry of Finance is only informed about the actual 
interest rate decision after it has been taken. But since the governor and the deputy governor inform the 
Ministry of Finance the day before the decision what they intend to suggest to the Executive Board, the 
government does in practice receive relevant information before the decision is taken. 
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Fourth, the right to instruct may conceivably have a disciplinary effect on politicians in 
power, preventing them from launching populist attacks on the central bank. With the 
right to instruct, such attacks become more difficult as they will be met with a demand 
for action. The possibility of instruction may thus influence the political debate, making it 
more sober and characterised to a lesser extent by short-term considerations and 
populism. 
 
Three other aspects of Norges Bank’s independence are worth mentioning. First, Norges 
Bank is counted as one of the most transparent central banks in the world. The high 
degree of transparency partly compensates for the low degree of formal independence 
and weak internal checks and balances discussed above. 
 
Second, a Supervisory Council is part of the checks and balances system in Norges Bank. 
The Council supervises the operations of the Bank and ensures that Norges Bank operates 
in accordance with the Norges Bank Act. The Council supervises the Executive Board to 
ensure that the Board’s management and control of the Bank’s administration and 
operations are satisfactory, and that appropriate procedures have been established to 
ensure that the Bank’s activities are conducted in accordance with legislation. The 
Council consists of 15 members that are appointed for four-year terms by the political 
parties represented in parliament, and submits an annual report to parliament on its 
supervision of the Bank. The Supervisory Council does not play an active day-to-day role 
and, although its work load is rather limited, it plays an important role as a control 
mechanism. 
 
Third, in contrast to the legislation for most other central banks, the Norges Bank Act of 
1985 does not explicitly mention price stability as a main responsibility of Norges Bank. 
In general, the more independent the central bank is, the more important it becomes that 
the mandate is specified precisely in the law. For this reason, it could be argued that if 
legislation is changed to allow Norges Bank to be more independent, then it is also 
natural to introduce price stability as the explicit responsibility of Norges Bank. In 
contrast to most other central banks, the Executive Board of Norges Bank has additional 
duties in that it is also responsible for the operations of NBIM. It may therefore seem 
paradoxical that the external members of the Executive Board are only part-time. 
Moreover, new policy instruments related to macroprudential regulation will in the future 
most likely involve even greater responsibilities and work load (even if these policy 
instruments should be allocated to the FSA). This naturally raises the question if the 
responsibilities of the external Executive Board members of Norges Bank are outgrowing 
the current institutional design. 8
 
 
                                                 
8 The role of the external Executive Board members has also been discussed before, e.g. in NBW 2005. 
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To what extent the Supervisory Council, politicians in general, financial markets and the 
general public are able to evaluate Norges Bank’s activities (and the influence from 
various members of the Executive Board) depends on the openness of the Bank. Norges 
Bank is generally counted as one of the world’s most transparent central banks. But there 
is still room for improvement. Previous versions of NBW have been relatively consistent 
in calling for more information to be published from the meetings of the Executive 
Board. NBW 2010 (p. 37) concluded that 
We suggest that non-attributed minutes could be published, in order to strengthen 
the accountability and further improve transparency. These minutes could note 
without attribution to individual members which issues were discussed and what 
arguments were presented, as well as how (if) individual members have voted.  
A similar view is echoed in NBW 2011 (p. 5): 
The committee believes that a record of the discussion that has preceded the 
decisions at the Executive Board’s meetings would be very useful and make 
monetary policy more transparent and credible. Making such information 
available would require minutes to be released from the policy meetings. 
There has been some progress on these issues. In MPR 3/11, page 7, the Executive 
Board’s assessment is discussed, including particular arguments that were discussed at 
specific previous meetings. 
 
The part-time position of the external Board members is an argument that has been used 
against proposals to publish minutes or voting records from the interest rate meetings. 
Given the institutional design, this may be a valid argument. Also, if the role of the Board 
is seen as more of an insurance mechanism that can pull the brake if things really get out 
of hand than playing an active part in reaching the optimal interest rate at each meeting, 
then minutes or voting records may distort the focus of the members. Also, minutes or 
voting records may result in individuals using their position to promote themselves rather 
than the collective interests of Norges Bank. Moreover, minutes could prevent a frank 
discussion and make members afraid of asking ‘stupid’ questions. 
On the other hand, such arguments come at the cost of less transparency. Also, one could 
make the argument that releasing more information from the meetings increases the 
incentive for members of the Board to perform their work well.  
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4.3 NBW view 
 
In the view of NBW, there is a need for reforming the institutional framework for Norges 
Bank. If Norges Bank is to be given a greater responsibility for macroprudential policies, 
its expanded mandate must be clearly specified and the Bank’s independence increased to 
create good conditions for accountability and efficiency in policy making. If Norges 
Bank is not to be given greater responsibility for macroprudential policies (and this role is 
given to the FSA instead), there will still be a need for reforms, but partly for other 
reasons. First, Norges Bank has a relatively low formal degree of independence today. 
Second, if the FSA is given responsibility for macroprudential policies, its decisions may 
have substantial implications for monetary policy, and whether (and how) the policies of 
the different authorities should be coordinated must be clarified in new legislation. 
NBW’s recommendations may be summarised as follows: 
- Norges Bank should not be required to inform the Ministry of Finance about its interest 
rate recommendation before the Executive Board meeting. 
- Given the extensive responsibilities of the Executive Board (and especially if their 
responsibilities are increased further, e.g. with respect to financial stability), the situation 
of the external members of the Board should be strengthened. For instance, their current 
part-time involvement is not entirely consistent with their responsibilities. 
- If the formal independence of Norges Bank is increased, it seems natural to specify in the 
legislation that price stability is one of Norges Bank’s primary responsibilities. 
- More information about the discussions between the members of the Executive Board 
should be published (in line with the suggestions made by NBW 2010 and 2011). 
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